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[So F. No. 18963. In Bank. Mar. 15, 1955.1 
EDWARD F. McKEON, Respondent, V. BEN L. aIUSTO, 
Appellant. 
[la, Ib] Contracts - Modification - Oral Modification of Written 
Contract.-Civ. Code, § 1698, declaring that contract in writing 
may be altered by contract in writing or by executed oral 
agreement, presupposes existing contract in writing, and ac-
cordingly does not invalidate new oral agreement made after 
written contract has expired by its terms or has been orally 
abrogated, cancelled or rescinded. 
[2] Master and Servant-Contracts of Employment-Termination. 
-Written contract for employment of plaintiff for one year 
for stated salary pIns percentage of profits of defendant's 
bnsiness terminates at end of year unless parties agree that 
it shall continue. 
[3] ld.-Contracts of Employment-Renewal of Agreement.-Fact 
that plaintiff continues in defendant's employ after end of year 
provided in written contract of employment for one year 
indicates, standing alone, that parties agreed to continuation 
of written contract. (See Lab. Code, § 3003.) 
[4] ld.-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Evidence.-In 
action to recover profits alleged to be due under terms of oral 
extension of written contract of employment for one year 
providing for stated salary plus sum which, when added to 
salary, would equal 30 per cent of net profits of defendant's 
business, evidence that plaintiff continued in defendant's em-
ploy after end of year in reliance on defendant's promise that 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 181 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts, 
§ 428. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 189; [2] Master and 
Servant, § 29; [31 Muster and Servant, ~ 30.5; [4, 7] Master and 
Ser.rnnt, §52; [5] Master Dnd Servant, ~55; [6] Contracts. §278; 
[8] Mn:;t(~r and Servant, * (3: [9] Master and Servant, § 20(2) ; 
[10J .Master and Servant, § 53. 
) 
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plaintiff would get his share of profits on uncompleted jobs 
indicates that parties did not intend that provisions of written 
contract should be applicable between last day of year and 
time new oral agreement was made, and .Justifies court's COll-
elusion that written contract expired at end of year. 
[6] Id.-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Findings.-In 
action to recover profits alleged to be due under terms of oral 
extension of written contract of employment for one year 
providing for stated salary plus sum which, when added to 
salary, would equal 30 per cent of net profits of defendant's 
business, findings referring to oral agreement as modification 
of written contract may, in view of finding that oral agreement 
was not made until after expiration of written contract, be 
reasonably interpreted as meaning, not that oral agreement 
was modification of existing written contract, but that new terms 
of employment were in part different from those set out in 
expired written contract, and as so interpreted findings are 
eonsistent with and support judgment for plaintiff. 
[6] Contracts-Actions-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether 
parties intended their oral agreement immediately to be effec-
tive or only to become binding on reducing it to writing is 
ordinarily question of fact to be resolved by court or jury in 
light of surrounding circumstances. 
['1] Master and Servant-Contracts of Employment-Compensa-
tion-Evidence.-In action to recover profits alleged to be due 
under terms of oral extension of written contract of employ-
ment for one year providing for stated salary plus sum which, 
when added to salary, would equal 30 per cent of net profits 
of defendant's business, a finding that parties reached binding 
oral understanding in January following end of year covering 
profits on. jobs commenced in year of contract but not com-
pleted until following year, and that defendant wrongfully 
terminated this oral agreement at end of February, is sus-
tained by evidence that in December defendant told plaintiff 
he would get his share of profits on uncompleted jobs and 
hence must have known, when plaintiff continued in his em-
ploy at end of year, that plaintiff was relying on such promise, 
and by evidence that in January plaintiff asked for and was 
given an advance on anticipated profits of certain job. 
[8] Id. - Contracts of Employment - Validity.-Where evidence 
establishes new oral agreement of employment following 
termination of original written contract, fact that parties might 
thereafter be unable to agree on clarification of oral agree-
ment would not affect its validity. 
[9] Id.-Contracts of Employment - Compensation - Amount.-
Where evidenc(' establighes new oral agrpement of employment 
following termination of original written contract, employee's 
l 
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testimony that he was unwilling to make any "more" agree-
ments until be ka.ew what he "had coming from what was on 
the books," made in response to employer's proposal that 
profit-sharing arrangement be changed, is consistent with em-
ployee's position that he was entitled to share in profits under 
oral agreement. 
[10] Id.-Contracts of Employment-Compensation-Questions of 
Law and Fact.-In action to recover profits alleged to be due 
under terms of oral extension of written contract of employ-
ment for one year providing for stated salary plus sum which, 
when added to salary, would equal 30 per cent of net profits 
of defendant's business, where plaintiff testified that he left de-
fendant's employ because "I couldn't get an accounting, and I 
wasn't going to get any more contract or any renewal, and I 
had to think about going out and getting another job," it was 
for trial court to resolve ambiguity of such testimony in light 
of all evidence, and since, at time to which plaintiff referred, 
defendant had clearly indicated that he was not going to 
execute any written profit-sharing agreement as he had prom-
ised to do or recognize plaintiff's right to share in profits on 
job not completed in year covered by written contract, it 
could not be held as matter of law that trial court erred in 
interpreting such testimony as referring to new written con-
tract which was to supersede oral agreement. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Frank T. Deasy, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Action to recover profits alleged to be due under tenns 
of oral extension of written contract of employment. Judg-
ment for plaintiff affirmed. 
W. Burleigh Pattee, Bruce M. Casey and Chickering & 
Gregory for Appellant. 
Joseph C. Haughey and Toland C. McGettigan for Re-
spondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-In August, 1950, defendant orally agreed 
to employ plaintiff on a full time basis in his general con-
tracting business. The agreement was put in writing in 
April, 1951, in the form of a letter from defendant to plaintiff, 
which provided: 
"I hereby offer to employ you as an estimator and office 
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one year commencing January 1, 1951, and ending December 
31, 1951, upon the following terms and conditions: 
"1. I agree to pay you a salary of One Hundred Dollars 
($100) per week, together with a sum which when added to 
the aforesaid salary will equal thirty (30) percent of my net 
profits from said business, before income taxes, but after 
deducting all charges and expenses, during said year, and 
computed as hereinafter set forth. Said additional sum shall 
be payable annually after the completion of the annual audit 
of the books of my business, but in any event before March 
1, 1952. 
"2. In computing the said net profits there shall be ex-
cluded all payments received by me from the Drs. A. and E. 
Torre for the construction of a building at Gough and Union 
streets in San Francisco, California. There shall be included 
in computing the net profits, if any, the amount due on all 
the jobs which have been fully completed during the year 
1951, but on which full paymelit may not have been made 
during said year; provided, however, that your share of any 
net profits resulting from said jobs shall not be payable until 
final payment on such jobs has been received. 
"3. It is understood that in determining the net profit 
from said business all computations shall be based on [an 
accrual] basis of accounting and that the books shall be 
audited on a calendar year basis. The final audit as presented 
by the accountants shall be conclusive and final in determining 
net profits. 
"4. It is agreed that in the event you continue in my em-
ploy after December 31, 1951, it shall be at a salary of One 
Hundred Dollars ($100) per week plus only such amounts, 
if any, as may hereafter mutually be agreed upon in writing. 
"5. The foregoing agreement is intended to supersede the 
oral agreement under which you entered my employ on 
August 1, 1950 .... 
"The FOREGOING TERMS are hereby accepted and confirmed. 
[signed] E. F. McKeon." 
Although no written agreement extending the profit shar-
ing provision of the contract was executed, plaintiff continued 
in defendant's employ until February 29, 1952, and he con-
tinued to receive $100 per week until his employment termi-
nated. Thereafter plaintiff brought this action to recover 
profits alleged to be due under the terms of an oral extension 
of the written contract. Defendant denied that any oral ex-
tension had been made and deposited $132.64 in court, the 
/ 
) 
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amount he conceded was still due on 30 per cent of his profits 
for 1951. 
After a trial before the court sitting without a jury, the 
court found that" following the expiration of the said written 
agreement of employment . . . plaintiff and defendant, B. L. 
Giusto, on or about the 14th day of January, 1952, orally 
agreed that said agreement would be extended from and after 
January 1, 1952, and that the plaintiff would continue in the 
employment of said defendant, and said defendant would 
continue to employ plaintiff upon the same terms and at the 
same rate of compensation specified and set forth in Para-
graphs 1, 2 and 3 of said written agreement of employment 
• • . , and contrary to and in modification and abandonment 
of the provisions of Paragraph 4 .•. , and for such period 
of time as would be required to bring to completion those 
. • . [three building J projects which were entered upon by 
defendant prior to December 31, 1951, but which were not 
completed on said date." It also found that on or about 
February 26, 1952, "defendant advised plaintiff that he did 
not wish to continue with said contract and said defendant 
did thereupon and wrongfully and without cause notify plain-
tiff that his services were no longer wanted or required by 
defendant and plaintiff's contract was terminated and at an 
end. " Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for 
$14,396.28, the amount that the parties stipulated would be 
plaintiff's share of the profits from the three jobs started in 
1951 but not completed until 1952, under the terms of the 
oral extension agreement found to exist by the trial court. 
Defendant appeals. 
Defendant contends that there is no evidence to support 
the finding that an oral agreement extending the written 
contract was made and that even if such an agreement was 
made, it would be invalid under section 1698 of the Civil 
Code. 
[1a] Section 1698 provides that "A contract in writing 
may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an executed 
oral agreement, and not otherwise." The section presupposes 
an existing contract in writing, and accordingly, it does not 
invalidate a new oral agreement made after a written con-
tract has expired by its terms or has been orally abrogated. 
cancelled, or rescinded by the parties. (Treadwell v. Nickel, 
194 Cal. 243, 258-259 [228 P. 25] ; McClure v. Alberti. 190 
Cal. 348. 350 f212 P. 2041 : Pearsall v. Henry, 153 Cal. 314. 
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517 [210 P.2d 877]; Martin v. Butter, 93 Cal.App.2d 562, 
566 [209 P.2d 636]; Treat v. Ogden, 56 Cal.App.2d 70, 
74-76 [132 P.2d 493] ; Klein Norton 00. v. Oohen, 107 Cal. 
App. 325, 331 [290 P. 613] ; Bevans v. Huntington, 65 Cal. 
App. 266, 268 [223 P. 572].) [2] In the present case, in 
the absence of an agreement extending the written contract, 
neither party was bound by its terms after December 31, 
1951. After that date plaintiff was free to leave defendant's 
employ, and defendant was free to discharge him. Thus, the 
contract was at an end on December 31, 1951. unless the 
parties agreed that it should continue. [3] It is true that 
the fact that plaintiff continued in defendant's employ after 
December 31, 1951 would, standing alone, indicate that the 
parties had agreed to a continuation of the written contract. 
(See Lab. Code, § 3003.) [4] There is substantia] evidence, 
however, that the parties did not intend that plaintiff's con· 
tinued employment should be compensated at the rate. of 
$100 per week as provided in the written contract. Thus, 
in December defendant told plaintiff that he would get his 
share of the profits on the uncompleted jobs, and plaintiff 
continued in defendant's employ after the end of the year in 
reliance on this promise. Although the trial court found 
that the parties did not execute their new oral agreement 
until on or about January 14th, the foregoing evidence clearly 
indicates that the parties did not intend that the provisions 
of the written contract should be applicable between De· 
cember 31, 1951, and the time the new oral agreement was 
made, and the trial court was therefore justified in con-
cluding that the written contract expired at the end of the 
year. [Ib] Accordingly, section 1698 would not invalidate 
any new oral agreement that the parties might make. 
[5] It is contended, however, that the findings of the trial 
court cannot reasonably be interpreted as determining that 
the written contract terminated on December 31, 1951. This 
contention is based upon the findings that refer to the oral 
agreement as a modification of the written contract and upon 
the lack of a finding that the oral agreement superseded the 
written contract. The trial court expressly found. however, 
that the oral agreement was made on or about the 14th day 
of January "following the expiration of the said written 
agreement of employment," and as pointed out above. if the 
written contract had expired it no longer stood in the way of 
the parties entering into a new oral agreement. Moreover. 
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until after the expiration of the written contract, the findings 
with respect to an oral modification of the written contract 
may reasonably be interpreted as meaning, not that the oral 
agreement was a modification of an existing written con-
tract, but that the new terms of employment were in part 
different from those set out in the expired written contract. 
Thus, the oral agreement constituted a modification of the 
written contract only in the sense that it adopted the pro-
visions thereof with modifications agreeable to both parties. 
So interpreted, the findings are consistent and support the 
judgment. To iuterpret the references to an oral modification 
as constituting findings that an existing written contract 
was modified, on the other hand, would create a clear conflict 
with the finding that the oral agreement was not made until 
after the written contract had expired and would violate the 
settled rule that the findings must be considered as a whole 
and liberally construed to support the judgment. (Haight 
v. Haight, 151 Cal. 90, 92 [90 P. 197] ; Hotaling v. Hotaling, 
193 Cal. 368, 385 [224 P. 455] ; Hartford v. Pacific Motor T. 
00., 16 Cal.App.2d 378, 381 [60 P.2d 476]; 8nearly v. 
Hiestand, 50 Ca1.App. 393, 396 [195 P. 272].) 
The pivotal question, therefore, is whether the evidence 
sustains the finding of the trial court that on or about January 
14th the parties orally agreed that plaintiff should continue 
to share in the profits of defendant's business until such 
time as the three building projects commenced in 1951 should 
be completed. Defendant contends that the evidence shows 
only that the parties were negotiating the terms of a new 
contract, but that it was understood that no new contract 
would become binding until it was reduced to writing and 
signed by both parties. [6] It is not uncommon, however, 
for parties to make an oral agreement with the intention 
to reduce it to writing or supersede it by a new written 
contract. In such cases, whether they intended their oral 
agreement to be immediately effective or only to become 
binding on the execution of the writing, is ordinarily a ques-
tion of fact to be resolved by the trial court or jury in the 
light of all of the surrounding circumstances. (Empire etc. 
Bldgs. 00. v. Harvey Mach. 00., 122 Cal.App.2d 411, 415 
[265 P.2d 32] ; Oolumbia Pictu.res Corp. v. De Toth, 87 Cal. 
App.2d 620, 629 [197 P.2d 580] ; .Johnston v. 20th Oentury-
Fox Film Oorp., 82 Cal.App.2d 796. 820-821 [187 P.2d 474].) 
[7] In the present case plailltiff testified that he talked to 
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tract. He pointed out to defendant that some of the jobs 
on which he had worked would not be completed in 1951 and 
that he wanted to be covered for his percentage of the profits 
on those jobs. Defendant told him that he would take the 
matter up with his lawyer and not to worry, that he would 
get his share on those jobs. Defendant stated at that time 
that he would renew the contract. The matter was discussed 
by the parties again in the middle of January, at which time 
defendant again promised to have a written contract drawn 
up and advanced plaintiff $500 as part of his share of the 
profits anticipated on a construction job for the Navy, one 
of the jobs started in 1951 and due to be completed early 
in 1952. In the middle of February, however, defendant told 
plaintiff that" I would like to change the set-up and possibly 
put you on a salary basis and a bonus arrangement, or some-
thing more definite." He stated that the profit sharing 
arrangement was unsatisfactory for government work because 
government contracts were subject :to renegotiation. Plaintiff 
stated that he was unwilling to make any more agreements 
until he knew what he "had coming from what was on the 
books." There were further conversations, but the parties 
were unable to agree on any new terms of employment, and 
plaintiff left defendant's employ at the end of February, 
after defendant had made it clear that he was unwilling to 
continue the profit sharing agreement. 
From the foregoing evidence the trial court was justified 
in concluding that the parties reached a binding oral under-
standing in January covering the profits on the jobs com-
menced in 1951 but not completed until 1952, and that de-
fendant wrongfully terminated this agreement at the end 
of February. Thus, in December defendant told plaintiff that 
he would get his share of the profits on the uncompleted jobs, 
and he must have known when plaintiff continued in his 
employ after the end of the year that plaintiff was relying 
on his promise. From the fact that in January plaintiff 
asked for and was given an advance on the anticipated profits 
of the Navy job, the trial court could reasonably infer that 
the parties had agreed that the new oral agreement was in 
effect. Moreover, the trial court could infer from defendant's 
February proposal to change the setup from a profit sharing 
to a salary basis that defendant recognized at that time an 
existing profit sharing agreement. Finally, the conclusion 
that the parties had reached a binding oral understanding 
:finds support in the evidence with respect to their de.aljnga 
) 160 McKEON v. GIUsTO [44 C.2d 
in the past. Thus, when plaintiff first entered defendant's 
employ, he worked for eight months under an oral contract 
before his agreement was reduced to writing as contemplated 
~y the parties. 
[8] Defendant contends, however, that the force of the 
foregoing evidence was completely destroyed by plaintiff's 
uwn testimony, which he interprets as establishing that the 
parties never reached a new agreement. This contention 
confuses the issue of whether the parties reached a new oral 
agreement with respect to the profits for the three jobs started 
in 1951 with the question whether they agreed to all of the 
terms of a written contract that would integrate or supersede 
their oral agreement. It is true that plaintiff testified that 
he expected to secure a new written contract and that he 
did not consider himself bound to accept whatever written 
contract defendant might offer. Thus it appears that there 
were certain ambiguities with respect to the meaning of com-
pleted jobs and the method of accounting that plaintiff wanted 
to have clarified in the new contract, and with respect to 
these ambiguities plaintiff testified that the parties never 
reached any agreement. It is not contended, however, that 
the oral agreement found by the court to exist, was too in-
definite to constitute a valid contract, and the fact that the 
parties might thereafter be unable to agree on its clarification 
would not affect its validity. 
[9] Defendant also relies on plaintiff's testimony that he 
was unwilling to make any " more" agreements until he 
knew what he "had coming from what was on the books." 
This testimony, however, referred to plaintiff's response to 
defendant's February proposal that the profit sharing ar-
rangement be changed. Plaintiff's refusal at that time to 
make any more agreements until he knew what he had coming 
is clearly consistent with his position that he was then entitled 
to share in the profits under the oral agreement. It indicates 
only an unwillingness to change that agreement until he 
knew what he would receive under it. 
[10] Finally defendant relies on plaintiff's testimony that 
he left defendant's employ because "I couldn't get an ac-
counting, and I wasn't going to get any more contract or 
any renewal, and I had to think about going out and getting 
another job. The rug was pulled out from under me." This 
testimony is ambiguous. The phrase "any more contract or 
any renewal" might be interpreted as referring to any con-
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also be interpreted as referring to any written contract or 
renewal after the January 1952 oral contract. It was for 
the trial court to resolve this ambiguity in the light of all 
of the evidence. Since at the time to which plaintiff referred, 
defendant had clearly indicated that he was .lot going to 
execute any written profit sharing agreement, as he had 
promised to do, or recognize plaintiff's right to share in the 
profits on the job not completed in 1951, as he had also prom-
ised to do, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial 
. court erred in interpreting this testimony as referring to 
the new written contract that was to integrate or supersede 
the oral agreement. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J' t and Carter, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-The judgment is affirmed upon the theory 
that the written contract was term!nated at the end of 1951 
and that the parties thereafter made anew, superseding oral 
agreement. The trial court made no express finding to that 
effect. It is reasoned, however, that such a finding may be 
implied from the use of certain phrases, one of which 
states that the written contract was orally renewed and modi-
fied. Then, under the rule that findings are to be construed 
liberally in support of the judgment, the implied finding is 
given controlling effect over nearly a dozen express findings 
directly in conflict with it.! 
IAll of the findings relating to the agreement of January 14th are 
as follows. Emphasis is added: 
"IV 
"That it is true as in Paragraph VII of plaintiff's first cause of 
action in his complaint herein alleged and set forth that following the 
expiration of the said written agreement of employment made and en-
tered into by said plaintiff and said defendant, B. L. Biusto, on April 
11, 1951, as hereinabove set forth, said plaintiff and defendant, B. L. 
Giusto, on or about the 14th day of January, 1952, orally agreed that 
said agreement would be e:z:tended from and after January 1, 1952, and 
that the plaintiff would continue in the employment of said defendant, 
and said defendant would continue to employ plaintiff upon the same . 
terms and at the same rate of compensation spccified and sct forth in 
Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of said written agreement of employment as 
uecuted on April 11, 1951, and contraty to and in modification and 
abandonmeflt of the provisions of Paragraph 4 Of said agreement of 
employment, and for such period of time as would be required to bring 
to completion those certain hereinafter described projects which were 
entered upon by defendant prior to Decemher 11, 1951, but which were 
not completed on said date, and the court further finds in connection 
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Under the written contract, McKeon was to receive $100 
per week plus a percentage of the profits from jobs completed 
in 1951. Paragraph 4 provided: "It is agreed that in the 
event you continue in my employ after December 31, 1951, it 
shall be at a salary of One Hundred Dollars ($100) per week 
plus only such amounts, if any, as may hereafter mutually be 
agreed upon in writing." It is undisputed, and the trial '-ourt 
so found, that McKeon remained in Giusto '8 employ con· 
tinuously until February 29, 1952. 
In his complaint for "moneys due" filed in April of that 
year, McKeon sought an accounting to enable him to ascertain 
"the amount of money remaining due to him under and pur-
suant to said agreement of employment made and entered 
into by and between plaintiff and defendant on the 11th day 
of April, 1951, as aforesaid, and as thereafter extended and 
said defendant ••. did thereupon and repeatedly thereafter represilllt, 
state to, and advise plaintiff that he . . . would cause the terms of said 
agreement as orally modified and extended to be reduced to writing and 
the plaintiff remained in said defendant's employ on and after December 
31, 1951, pursuant to the terms, conditions and promises of the oral 
modification 01 said written agreement and in consideration thereof and 
in the belief and upon the understanding and representations of de-
fendant that said oral agreement would be immediately placed in writing. 
"V 
"The Court finds that it is true that plaintiff under and pursuant 
to said written agreement 01 employment and the Mal extension and 
modification thereof as hereinabove found and set forth, performed and 
rendered work, labor and services for said defendant, .•. from the date 
of January 1. 1951, up to and including the 29th day of February. 
1952 .... 
"VI 
"That from and after December 31, 1951 to and including February 
29, 1952, the defendant requested, permitted and allowed plaintiff to 
remain and continue in defendant's employment .•• and led plaintiff 
to believe that said employment of plaintiff by defendant was to con-
tinue until completion I)f the said projects, and that plaintiff was to be 
compensated at the same rate and upon the same terms as set forth in 
that certain written agreement between plaintiff and defendant. . • . 
"VII 
"The court further finds that su usequeut to December 31, 1951. and 
while plaintiff remained in the employ of defendant, B.L.Giusto, under 
and pursuant to said written contract of employment as orally extended, 
modified and executed. as hereinabove found, plaintiff repeatedly re-
quested defendant to proviue a new contract in writing pursuant to the 
oral agreement of plaintiff and defendant, but that said defendant, 
although promising so to do, failed and leglected to produce 8uch 
written contract. 
"VIII 
"The court further finds that prior and subsequent to December 31, 
1951, and while plaintiff remained in the employ of said defendant, B. L. 
Giusto, under and pursuant to said written contract of employment as 
orally extended and modified as hcrpinahove found, plaintiff repeatedly 
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continued. " He pleaded the making of the written contract 
and alleged that the parties "orally agreed to extend said 
agreement and to continue said plaintiff in his employment 
upon . • • terms • • • contrary to and in modification of the 
provisions of Paragraph 4 of said agreement of employment." 
Findings were made in favor of McKeon upon the theory 
of a breach of the written contract as extended and modified 
by a completely executed oral agreement. Specifically, the 
breach was found to have resulted from Giusto's wrongful 
discharge of McKeon which prevented him from performing 
the conditions "of the said agreement so made and entered 
into by and between plaintiff and defendant on the 11th day 
of April, 1951, as heretofore found, and as thereafter and on 
"X 
"The court further finds that on or about the 26th day of February, 
1952, and while said plaintiff was continuing to perform work, labor 
and services for the defendant, and while said plaintiff was awaiting the 
delivery to him of an agreement in writing covering his extended em-
ployment ••• defendant advised plaintiff that he did not wish to con-
tinue with said contract • • • and plaintiff's contract was terminated and 
at end. . 
"XI 
"That it is true that plaintiff had at all times performed and was 
at all times and on said 26th day of February, 1952, ready willing able 
to continue to perform all conditions of the said agreement so made 
and entered into by and between pZaintiff and defendant on the 11th 
day of .April, 1951, as heretofore found, and as thereafter and on or 
about the 14th day of January, 1952, of'ally modified and extended as 
of January 1, 1952, and as thereafter e:z:ecuted, on his part required 
to be performed but that plaintiff was prevented therefrom by de-
fendant •••• 
"XV 
"The court further finds that prior to December 31, 1951, said de-
fendant commenced work upon projects and/or jobs described as fol-
lows .••• 
"That plaintiff, at the instance and request of defendant, continued 
to render and perform and rendered and performed ••• labor and ser-
vices upon each of said projects .•. from and after December 31, 1951, 
and up to and including the 29th day of February, 1952, upon the under-
standing and agreemeut that he, the said plaintiff would be compensated 
therefor in accordance with the terms and provisions of his said agree-
ment with defendant as first written and as thereafter mOllified and 
ea:tended and carried out and executed as hereinabove found. 
"XXIII 
"The court finds that said written contract of April 11, 1951, was a 
valid and binding contract. 
"XXIV 
"The court finds that the oral agreement entered into by and between 
plaintif-' and defendant, B. L. Giusto, also known as Ben L. Giusto, 
on or about January 14, 1952, altering, amending and modifying the 
provisions of paragraph (4) of xaid written. agl'eement as hereinabove 
found, was thereafter executed by both of eaid parties and was a valid 
and binding agreement." 
) 
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or about the 14th day of January, 1952, orally modified and 
extended as of January 1, 1952, and as thereafter executed 
••.. " Throughout the findings the basis of Giusto's liability 
is stated to be "the oral modification of said written agree-
ment," "said written agreement of employment and the oral 
extension and modification thereof," and phrases of similar 
import. 
The basis for implying a superseding oral agreement is 
the portion of finding IV which states that "following the 
expiration of the said written agreement of employment" 
the parties" orally agreed" upon terms" contrary to and in 
modification and abandonment of the provisions of Paragraph 
4. " The word "expiration" is construed as meaning an 
abandonment of the terms of the written contract as of 
December 31, 1951. In that situation, it is said, the oral 
agreement of January 14th necessarily must be a superseding 
one. 
To construe "expiration" as meaning an "abandonment" 
of the terms of the written contract is to contradict directly 
the express findings which state that the written contract was 
renewed and extended. Those findings are consistent with 
section :3003 of the fJabor Code, which reads: "If, after the 
expiration of an agreement respecting wages and term of ser-
vice, the parties continue the relation of master and servant, 
they are presumed to have renewed the agreement for the same 
wages and term of service." (Emphasis added.) It is un-
disputed, and so found by the trial court, that McKeon re-
mained in Giusto's employ for two weeks after December 31, 
1951, and before the purported oral agreement was made. In 
that situation, a renewal of the original contract will be im-
plied in the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary 
or an amrmative showing that the parties did not so intend. 
(Henkel v. J. J. Henkel Co., 212 Cal. 288, 291-292 [298 P. 
28] ; lV1'lliams v. Schalk Chemical Co., 11 Cal.App.2d 396, 
397-398 [53 P.2d 10151; Lemley v. Doak Gas Engine Co., 
40 Cal.App. 146, 149 [180 P. 671] ; Lab. Code, § 3003.) 
There is no contractual provision contravening the findings 
which state that the original agreement was renewed. In-
stead, the written contract expressly contemplated McKeon's 
continuing employment bryontl 1951. Paragraph 4 provided 
that "in the event you fl\TeKeon] continue in my employ 
after December 31. 1951. it shall be at a salary of One Hun-
dred Dollars ($100) pCI' ,,:(~ek plus only such amounts, if any, 
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The majority reason that "the [vI'Titten] contract was at 
an end on December 31, 1951, unless the parties agreed that 
it should continue. Under its terms, however, it could con-
tinue only if plaintiff agreed to continue working for $100 per 
week, or the parties agreed in wrltmg un additional 
amounts. " I am unable to find in the contract "terms" 
making a continuation of its provisions dependent upon an 
agreement as to salary. That matter was fixed in paragraph 
4 as being "One Hundred Dollars ($100) per week plus only 
such amounts, if any, as may hereafter mutually be agreed 
upon in writing." The only condition precedent to the opera-
tion of that provision was that "you continue in my employ 
after December 31, 1951," which unquestionably McKeon did. 
It is suggested also that there is "substantial evidence . . . 
that the parties did not intend that plaintiff's continued em-
ployment should be compensated at the rate of $100 per week 
as provided in the written contract." This evidence, it is 
said, "clearly indicates that the parties did not intend that 
the provisions of the written contract should be applicable 
between December 31, 1951 and the time the new oral agree-
ment was made, and the trial court was therefore justified 
in concluding that the written contract expired at the end of 
the year." 
The trial court, however, made no finding that the parties 
intended to abandon the provisions of the written contract 
after 1951. On the contrary, it expressly found that the 
contract was renewed and extended. Whether the testimony 
relied upon as indicating an intention to abandon the written 
contract is sufficient to support such an inference is ques-
tionable.2 Certainly, it is not so clearly persuasive as to 
require the contrary finding to be disregarded. 
The pleadings were framed and findings were made upon 
the theory of an oral modification of the extended written 
·McKeon was asked if he had a conversation with Giusto in December, 
1951, "concerning the extension of the written contract of employment." 
McKeon replied that he did and stated: 
"On or about the middle of December I told Mr. Giusto that the 
contract was expiring at the end of the year, and asked him if he 
would have it renewed, making those corrections that we had discussed 
back in April on an accrued basis of accounting; and also to clarify 
those 'complete jobs' .••• I wanted to be sure tllat I was covered for 
my percentage of those jobs, and so advised him. And he said he would 
take the matter up with the lawyer, and not to worry about it; that I 
would get my share of these jobs .... " 
McKeon was asked: "Did Mr. Giusto state to you at that time, and in 
that eonversation, Mr. McKeon, that he would lelleW your eontzactl" 
-rae r~ waa. "lIe did." 
)-
) 
agreement. Although the findings should be construed 
liberally in support of the judgment, that principle does not 
allow a strained construction of them in order to reach what 
may appear to be an equitable result. 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Schauer J J., and Spence, J.J concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied AprD 13, 
1955. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spene~, J.. were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
